高管股权激励与公司异常关联交易:抑制还是加剧

Executive Equity Incentives and Abnormal Related Party Transactions:Restraint or Intensification

从高管股权激励是否能够抑制有损公司价值的行为视角,分析和检验高管股权激励对异常关联交易的影响及其作用机制。为了克服选择性偏误,采用双重差分倾向得分匹配法(PSM-DID)进行实证检验,研究结果显示高管股权激励与异常关联交易之间呈显著的负向关系,表明中国上市公司的高管股权激励抑制了异常关联交易,从而支持最优契约理论;截面分组发现高管股权激励对异常关联交易的抑制作用仅在公司治理水平较低的组显著;机制检验发现高管股权激励促使高管有强烈的动机提升公司业绩,进而抑制有损公司价值的异常关联交易行为。该结果验证了我国上市公司高管股权激励的实施效果符合最优契约理论而非管理层权力理论的推论,为证监会推行股权激励提供了经验证据。

From the unique perspective of whether executive equity incentive can inhibit the behavior that damages the value of the company,this paper systematically analyzes and tests the impact and mechanism of executive equity incentive on abnormal related party transactions.In order to overcome the selective bias,this paper uses the PSM-DID method to conduct empirical test.The results show that there is a significant negative relationship between executive equity incentive and abnormal related party transactions,indicating that the executive equity incentive of Chinese listed companies inhibits abnormal related party transactions and supports the optimal contracting theory;cross-sectional tests demonstrate that executive equity incentive has significant negative impact on abnormal related party transactions;the mechanism test shows that the management has a strong incentive to improve the performance of company after the implementation of equity incentive plans,so as to restrain related party transactions that damage the company’s value.It is verified that the implementation effect of executive equity incentive in Chinese listed companies conforms to the optimal contracting theory rather than the managerial power theory.It could also provide empirical evidence for the implementation of equity incentive by CSRC.