融资约束、政府补贴与中国企业海外投资效率--基于单边与双边随机前沿模型

Financial Constraints,Government Subsidies and the Efficiency of Chinese Enterprises’Overseas Investment:Based on Uni-and Bi-lateral Stochastic Frontier Model

采用2004—2018年中国企业绿地投资和跨境并购数据,通过拓展Richardson(2006)模型和传统单边随机前沿模型,实现了企业层面的海外投资效率测算。在此基础上,检验融资约束对中国企业海外投资效率的影响,并运用双边随机前沿模型进一步讨论融资约束与政府补贴二者的净效应。研究结果表明:融资约束对中国企业的海外投资效率具有显著的抑制作用,且抑制作用随着融资约束的增强而加剧;政府补贴可以部分缓解融资约束对海外投资效率的抑制作用,但是海外投资依然低于最优水平,即二者的净效应依然为负;非国有企业、制造业企业和在非沿线国家投资的企业,其海外投资效率变动更易受到融资约束水平的约束,而国有企业、制造业企业和在非沿线国家投资的企业,其所获政府补贴产生的缓解作用更胜一筹。

By extending Richardson(2006)and traditional SFA model,this paper uses data of Chinese enterprises’greenfield investment and cross-border M&A during 2004-2018 to measure the efficiency of overseas investment by Chinese enterprises for the first time.We examine the impact of financial constraints on overseas investment efficiency,and further discuss the net effect of financial constraints and government subsidies by adopting the bilateral SFA.The results show that financial constraints have a significant negative effect on overseas investment efficiency,which increases with the strengthening of financial constraints.Government subsidies can partially alleviate the negative effect of financial constraints,and thereby overseas investment is still below the optimal level and the net effect is negative.The efficiency of enterprises that are non-state-owned or investing in manufacturing industry,or in countries not along“the Belt and Road”,are more vulnerable to financial constraints,while government subsidies have better mitigation effects in enterprises that are state-owned or investing in manufacturing industry,or in countries not along“the Belt and Road”.