终极控股股东视角下的可转债融资选择研究--来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Research on the Convertible Bond Financing Selection from the Perspective of Ultimate Controlling Shareholder:Evidence from China’s Listed Companies

在资本市场改革持续稳步推进的背景下,2017年2月17日,证监会发布再融资新政引导上市公司再融资,而可转换债券由于不受新政约束,成为企业融资的重要手段之一,再融资市场的结构也发生了显著变化。基于终极控股股东视角,以2014—2019年发行可转债和进行定向增发、配股的上市公司为样本,运用Probit模型研究了终极控股股东控制权与现金流权的分离度对可转债融资选择的影响,以及内部控制质量、外部治理环境、企业生命周期对两者关系的调节作用。研究发现:终极控股股东的控制权与现金流权分离度越大,公司越倾向于发行可转债,以实现公司资本结构的优化。两权分离度与内部控制质量对可转债融资选择的影响具有交互作用,具体表现为,随着内部控制质量提高,两权分离导致的控股股东对可转债融资的正向支撑效应减弱;所在地市场化程度越高,两权分离度与可转债融资选择的正向关系越强。此外,区分企业所处生命周期,两权分离度与可转债融资选择均呈正相关关系,但主要体现在成熟期和衰退期,在成长期不存在显著影响,且影响强度从成长期到衰退期呈“递增型”。进一步研究表明,区分再融资新政颁布前后,这一正向支撑效应主要体现于新政颁布后,在新政颁布前不存在显著影响。从控股股东实施支撑行为的角度解释上市公司可转债融资行为,为上市公司进行终极控股股东股权结构安排和可转债融资决策提供重要的经验借鉴,也为监管制度和政策的改进提供参考。

In the context of the continuous and steady progress of capital market reform,on February 17,2017,the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued a new refinancing policy to regulate and guide listed companies to refinance.Since convertible bonds are not restricted by the new policy,they have become one of the important means of corporate financing,and the structure of the refinancing market has also undergone significant changes.Based on the perspective of the ultimate controlling shareholder,taking the listed companies that issued convertible bonds,private placements and rights issues between 2014 and 2019 as samples,the Probit model is used to analyze the influence of control-cash flow rights divergence of ultimate controlling shareholder on the convertible bond financing selection,and the moderating effect of internal control quality,external governance environment and corporate life cycle.The study found that the greater the degree of control-cash flow rights divergence,the more likely the company is to issue convertible bonds to optimize the company’s capital structure.Secondly,control-cash flow rights divergence and the quality of internal control have an interactive effect on the convertible bond financing selection.Specifically,as the quality of internal control improves,the positive support effect of the controlling shareholder’s convertible bond financing due to control-cash flow rights divergence weakens.The higher the level of regional marketization,the stronger the positive relationship between control-cash flow rights divergence and convertible bond financing.In addition,distinguishing the life cycle of a company,the degree of control-cash flow rights divergence and the convertible bond financing selection are positively correlated,but it is mainly reflected in the maturity period and the recession period.There is no significant impact in the growth period,and the intensity of the impact is“increasing”from the growth period to the recession period.Further research shows that distinguishing between before and after the promulgation of the new refinancing policy,this positive support effect is mainly reflected in the promulgation of the new policy,and there is no significant impact before the promulgation of the new policy.Interpret the convertible bond financing behavior of listed companies from the perspective of controlling shareholder’s implementation of supporting behaviors,provides important experience for listed companies to arrange the ultimate controlling shareholder’s equity structure and convertible bond financing decisions,and also provides corresponding reference for the improvement of regulatory systems and policies.