管理层权力、内部控制与成本粘性

Managerial Power,Internal Control and Cost Stickiness

自2015年以来,我国明确提出“供给侧结构性”和“降成本”的政策目标。本文以2010-2019年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,运用实证研究的方法对管理层权力与成本粘性之间的关系进行探究,并进一步探讨了内部控制在管理层权力与成本粘性间发挥的作用。研究结论如下:我国A股上市公司中普遍存在着成本粘性问题;管理层权力越大,成本粘性问题越严重;高质量的内部控制能够约束管理层权力,从而降低成本粘性水平。由此提出几点建议:完善公司治理机制,合理控制管理层权力;健全内部控制体系,建立授权审批和职务分离制度;完善成本费用管理追究制度,将成本费用指标纳入考核体系。

Since 2015,China has clearly put forward the policy objectives of "supply-side structure"and "cost reduction". This paper takes China’s A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019 as the research object,uses the method of empirical research to explore the relationship between managerial power and cost stickiness,and further discusses the role of internal control in the relationship between managerial power and cost stickiness. The conclusions are as follows: there is a widespread problem of cost stickiness in China’s A-share listed companies;the greater the power of management,the more serious the problem of cost stickiness;high quality internal control can constrain managerial power,thus reducing the level of cost stickiness. Therefore,some suggestions are put forward: improve the corporate governance mechanism and control the managerial power reasonably;improve the internal control system,establish the authorization and job separation system;improve the cost and expense management and investigation system,and incorporate the cost and expense indicators into the assessment system.