环保督察背景下污染行业上市公司环境信息披露研究——基于演化博弈的视角

Research on Environmental Information Disclosure of Listed Companies in Polluting Industries under the Background of Environmental Supervision——Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

证监会要求2020年底全面实施环境信息强制性披露,那么如何在中央环保督察背景下促进污染行业上市公司披露高质量环境信息是目前值得研究的问题。基于演化博弈理论,构建中央环保督查、政府及污染行业上市公司三方演化博弈模型,研究行为主体的策略选择问题并利用MATLAB仿真不同参数变化时模型的演化均衡策略。结果表明,只有在污染行业上市公司内部成本收益发生变化的同时,加强其外部监督力量的作用,才可以较大程度上使污染行业上市公司披露高质量环境信息趋于稳定状态。

The China Securities Regulatory Commission requires the full implementation of mandatory disclosure of environmental information by the end of 2020.So how to promote the disclosure of highquality environmental information by listed companies in polluting industries in the context of national environmental protection supervision is worth a study.Based on an evolutionary game theory,this paper builds a tripartite evolutionary game model of national environmental supervision,government,and listed companies in polluting industries to study the choice of strategies of behavioral agents while using Matlab to simulate the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the model when different parameters change.The results show that only when the internal cost and benefits of listed companies in polluting industries change and the force of external supervision is strengthened as well,can the disclosure of high-quality environmental information of listed companies in polluting industries become stable to a large extent.