论守信激励生成理论观照及完善进路

Reflection on the Trustworthy Incentives Generating Theory and Paths of Improvement

守信激励规则滥觞于信用法治化进程与柔性行政理论。守信激励本质上是由立法赋予守信主体间博弈均衡以"显著性"特征,以引导守信主体主动选择特定均衡。从规范层面来看,守信激励因存在信息不对称、行政主体"轻激励而重惩戒"以及激励程序设计不合理等现象,导致立法目的模糊、激励对象覆盖面过窄及激励效果不佳的后果。立法应从法律规范层面进一步完善守信激励配套规则,提升守信激励制度的系统性和科学性;细化守信激励规则实施内涵,引入第三方信用信息服务以完善信用评价体系;适度扩大守信激励主体范围,形成权利救济上的司法程序保障。

The rule of trustworthy incentives originates from the process of credit legalization and the flexible administration theory.Trustworthy incentives in essence mean that the legislation attaches“salience”characteristic to the game equilibrium between the trustworthy subjects,which intends to lead them to actively choose certain equilibrium.From the perspective of norms,trustworthy incentives are faced with the problems of information asymmetry,light incentive and heavy punishment of the administrative subjects and improper incentive procedure designing,etc.,which cause the ambiguity of the legislative purpose,the narrow coverage of incentive targets,and poor incentive effect.Three paths should be taken by the legislation to improve the trustworthy incentives:further improving the supporting rules of trustworthy incentives to enhance the systematic and scientific element of the trustworthy incentives system;specifying the implementation connotation of the trustworthy incentives rules and introducing the third-party credit information service provider to improve the credit assessment system;appropriately expanding the scope of trustworthy incentives subjects and providing judicial procedure safeguard for right relief.