摘要
在日本公司治理领域同时存在着"重视企业(生产者)"的真实原则与"重视股东"的表面原则。日本公司治理平成改革第一阶段表现出的推动"重视股东"的"符合国际标准"的公司治理改革目标与制度安排的部分脱节与矛盾,及第二阶段反映出的推动"进攻型"公司治理改革的政策逻辑缺陷,正是日本"重视股东"的表面原则与"重视企业"的真实原则在公司治理平成改革中的映射。认识到日本公司治理原则的两面性,不仅有利于揭示日本公司治理实践中"内部人控制"长期存在的制度性因素,而且对解释日本经济现象、企业制度、组织行为的特征化事实具有重要的意义。
In the field of corporate governance in Japan, there are two "real principles" of "attaching importance to enterprises(producers)" and "superficial principles of paying attention to shareholders ". The first stage of the reform of Japanese corporate governance shows that the goal of corporate governance reform which is in line with international standards and the system arrangement of "paying attention to shareholders" is disjointed and contradictory. The logic defects of promoting the reform of aggressive corporate governance reflected in the second stage are the superficial principles of "paying attention to shareholders" and the true origin of "attaching importance to enterprises" the mapping in the reform of corporate governance. It is not only helpful to reveal the reasons why the "insider control" can be maintained for a long time in the practice of corporate governance in Japan, but also has important significance to explain the characteristic facts of Japanese economic phenomenon, enterprise system and organizational behavior.
作者
平力群
PING Liqun(Institute of Japanese Studies,Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences,Tianjin,300191,China)
出处
《现代日本经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第3期68-81,共14页
Contemporary Economy OF Japan
基金
国家社科基金后期资助项目“日本公司法制度变迁与公司治理演化研究”(17FGJ008)。
关键词
公司治理改革
“重视企业”的真实原则
“重视股东”的表面原则
权力配置
内部人控制
corporate governance reform
the real principle of"attaching importance to enterprises"
superficial principle of"attaching importance to shareholders"
power allocation
insider control