关联并购与业绩承诺可靠性

Related-Party M&As and the Reliability of Performance Commitments

近年来,我国并购重组市场中标的公司业绩承诺频繁落空的现象引发了资本市场各参与方的关注。利用2009〜2019年间A股上市公司的并购交易及其业绩承诺协议履行情况数据,本文研究发现:(1)相比非关联并购,与控股股东存在关联的并购交易中,标的公司业绩承诺可靠性更低,即业绩承诺不达标的可能性更大;(2)机构投资者持股比例越高,关联并购与业绩承诺可靠性的负相关关系越弱;(3)相比国有上市公司,关联并购与业绩承诺可靠性的负相关关系在非国有上市公司中表现得更强。进一步地,本文发现关联并购中标的公司倾向于做出更加激进的业绩承诺;相比非关联并购,关联并购活动中并购方控股股东更可能收购盈利能力差的标的资产;并购支付方式中股份支付占比越高,关联并购对标的公司业绩承诺可靠性的负向影响越弱。本文的研究结论为并购重组市场业绩承诺频繁落空的现象提供了一个合理的理论解释,给资本市场各参与方更好地识别和监督关联并购活动中控股股东的机会主义行为提供了有价值的实践启示。

In recent years,the outbreak of the default of performance commitments in China’s M&A market has arouse the attention of investors and regulators in the capital market.Using the samples of M&A events with performance commitments in China’s capital market from 2009 to 2019,this paper finds that:(1)compared with non-related-party M&As,the reliability of the performance commitments is lower in related-party M&As;(2)higher institutional ownership can weaken the negative relationship between related-party M&As and the reliability of performance commitments;(3)compared with SOEs,the negative relationship between related-party M&As and the reliability of performance commitments is more pronounced in non-SOEs.Further analysis shows that the target firms in related-party M&As are likely to issue more aggressive performance commitments.The controlling shareholders are more inclined to acquire target firms with poor profitability.The higher equity payment can significantly weaken the negative impact of relatedparty Mc&As on the reliability of performance commitments.These findings offer a reasonable explanation for the outbreak of the default of performance commitments,and are helpful for regulators and investors to better identify the motivation of controlling shareholders and monitor their behavior in related-party M&As.