如何避免“失街亭”:论公共管理中的信任建立机制

Building the Mechanism of Trust in Public Administration

经济学中的动态不一致性理论和理性预期理论可以用来分析在公共管理中公共部门与公众之间互信的形成和丧失机制。公共管理体现为公共部门和民众之间的互动,互信和合作产生于这种互动并影响到公共管理的效率。这种互动不断重复地进行,从而公共管理也表现为一个不断重复的博弈过程。在一次性阶段博弈中存在动态不一致性,即公共部门的长期最优计划与短期最优计划是背离的,由此引发的公共部门的短期行为被民众理性预期后,会导致互信丧失和拒不合作,最终出现囚徒困局。但是,当阶段博弈不断重复进行时,就存在着多重子博弈精炼纳什均衡,其中有有效率的,也有缺乏效率的。公共管理需要通过机制设计,实现有效率的子博弈精炼的纳什均衡。互信的建立过程普遍存在于各种人际交往和公共管理中,呈现出特定的规律,而中国古典文学故事“失街亭”形象地呈现了这种规律。

Theories of dynamic insistency and rational expectation in economics can be used to analyze the formation of trust between the public sector and the public.The essence of public administration is interaction between the public sector and the public.The success of public administration depends on trust between the public sector and public administration,which results from the interaction that repeats continually and turns public administration into repeated games.There exists the problem of dynamic inconsistency that the public sector s long-term optimal plan differs from its short-term optimal plan.Because of the inconsistency,the public sector is inclined to obtain the short-term benefits at the cost of its long-term benefits,and the public can rationally expect this inclination.As a result,trust disappears,and cooperation fails so that prisoner s dilemma prevails.However,if the stage game repeats over and over,there will be multi subgame perfect Nash equilibria,some of which are efficient,and others are not.Therefore,the public sector should design a mechanism to realize efficient subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.The formation of trust can be found prevalently in social interaction and public administration and exhibits specific pattern.The story of“Losing Jieting”in classic Chinese novel Three Kingdoms illustrates the logic of this pattern.