再论儒家德行伦理学:与黄勇先生商榷

Revisiting Confucian De Xing ethics:a discussion with Dr.Huang Yong

黄勇认为,“美德伦理学”比“德行伦理学”能更好地反映儒家伦理学的特质。他的证说至少有三处值得商榷。首先,作为具有互释性的儒家概念,“德行”与“德”皆将品格与行为视为一体之两面,“德行”并非以“德”作为“行”的修饰词。由此,virtue虽然不能被翻译成“德行”,但从语言翻译的角度否定“儒家德行伦理学”的结论亦不能成立。其次,“德行”而非作为品格的“美德”才是儒家伦理学的首要概念。在儒家那里,从品格无法派生出情感与行为,而“德行”则能定义品格与行为,所以,“儒家德行伦理学”才是更为恰当的表达。最后,“儒家德行伦理学”并没有排除对情感的关注,而是在品格评判中同时兼及情感与行为两个向度,由于特定原因而未发行为的不正常情况得到了儒家式的独特应答。由此,我们不能认为其限制了儒家伦理学的范围。要彻底走出以西释中的研究路径,唯有“德行伦理学”才能表达儒家伦理学不同于西方伦理学的理论特质。

Huang Yong believes that“Virtue Ethics”can better reflect the characteristics of Confucian ethics than“De Xing Ethics”.There are at least three aspects in his argument that are debatable.First of all,as two Confucian concepts mutually interpretable,both“De Xing”and“De”consider character and conduct as two sides of the same coin.And in“De Xing”,De or virtue is not a modifier of“Xing”or conduct.However,it is unfounded to deny the validity of Confucian De Xing Ethics from the perspective of language translation just because virtue cannot be translated as“De Xing”.Secondly,“De Xing”is the most important concept of Confucian ethics,that represents character.In Confucianism,emotion and conduct cannot be derived from character,but“De Xing”can define character and conduct.Thus,“Confucian De Xing Ethics”is a more appropriate expression.Thirdly,“Confucian De Xing Ethics”does not exclude the dimension of emotions.Rather,it includes both emotions and behavior in the criticism of character,which provides a unique Confucian explanation for the abnormal situation where feelings are not aroused,or Weifa(未发).As a result,we should not say that it limits the scope of Confucian ethics.On the contrary,we should change the course and move from interpreting China from a western perspective.Only“De Xing Ethics”can demonstrate the theoretical characteristics of Confucian ethics that are different from those of Western ethics.