模糊的属地化管理:政策执行偏差的一种解释——以流动人口服务供给为例

Fuzzy Localized Management:A Framework for Public Policy Deviation——Case Study on Floating Population in S City

地方政府为何会出现政策执行偏差呢?已有研究从压力论和激励论两个方面分析强压力和强激励导致地方政府的政策执行,弱压力和弱激励导致地方政府的政策执行偏差,这为我们理解地方政府政策执行偏差提供了很好的视角。但是,为何一项国家三令五申重视和强调的政策难以落地呢?压力理论和激励理论忽略了国家内部的组织结构以及该组织结构对压力与激励的影响。国家组织内部呈现模糊的属地化管理的实然特征。 模糊的属地化管理导致地方政府的政策执行偏差,形成压力和激励无效传导机制。S市流动人口服务供给的个案研究,验证了模糊的属地化管理导致政策执行偏差的机制。该机制的理论贡献在于,在压力论和激励论的基础上提出压力和激励的传导过程,建构“模糊的属地化管理导致压力和激励无效传导”的理论框架,为政策执行偏差提供另外一种解释。

Why do the local governments deviate public policy?Some analyzed that strong pressure and strong incentive lead to local government’s policy implementation.On the contrary,weak pressure and weak incentive lead to local government’s policy deviation.But why is it difficult to implement public policy that the state has strongly stressed?This paper argues that the pressure theory and incentive theory ignore the pressure and incentive transfer system.The paper puts forward the transfer system of pressure and incentive from above government to below one,build a theoretical framework of“fuzzy localized management leading to ineffective transmission of pressure and incentive”.Taking the public service supply of floating population in S city as a case,this paper analyzes how the fuzzy localized management leads to policy deviation of the local government,which make the strong pressure and incentive does not work.The theoretical contribution of this paper is putting forward the transfer system of pressure and incentive from above government to below one,to provide another explanation for policy deviation.