混改背景下国企关键人激励机制 有利于探索式创新吗?

Is Incentive Mechanism for Key People in State-owned Enterprises Beneficial to Exploratory Innovation in the Mixed Ownership Reform?

在加快推进混合所有制改革的时代背景下,如何构建科学合理的激励机制促进国有企业进行探索式创新?这是实施国家创新驱动发展战略所需和社会关注的热点问题。本文以2012—2018年沪深A股国有上市公司为研究对象,考察了国有上市公司关键人(董事长和总经理)的薪酬和股权激励与探索式创新之间的逻辑关系。主要从国有上市公司混合所有制改革的视角,比较分析深度混改国有上市公司关键人激励机制对探索式创新影响的特殊性;并从国有上市公司分类治理的视角,进一步分析了不同功能类国有上市公司和不同要素密集度国有上市公司关键人激励机制对探索式创新影响的差异性。可以发现:(1)目前国有上市公司董事长薪酬激励水平显著影响探索式创新,总经理股权激励有利于促进探索式创新;(2)相较于一般国有上市公司,深度混改国有上市公司董事长薪酬激励对探索式创新具有显著促进作用,而总经理的薪酬激励效应不显著,但是总经理股权激励对探索式创新具有显著促进作用;(3)与商业竞争类、高技术型国有上市公司相比,特定功能类、非高技术型企业董事长薪酬激励对探索式创新具有抑制作用,总经理的薪酬激励效应仍不显著;但是总经理股权激励对商业竞争类、高技术型企业的探索式创新具有显著促进作用。

How to build a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote exploratory innovation in state-owned enterprises in the mixed ownership reform? This is a hot issue of public concern demanded by the national innovation-driven development strategy. This paper studies state-owned companies listed between 2012 and 2018, and investigates the logical relationship between the salary and equity incentive for key people in these companies, i.e., chairman and general manager and exploratory innovation. From the perspective of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, this paper compares and analyzes the particularity of the influence of incentive mechanism for key people in state-owned enterprises undergoing profound mixed ownership reform on exploratory innovation. From the perspective of classified governance of state-owned enterprises, this paper further analyzes differences in the influence of incentive mechanism for key people in state-owned enterprises with different functions and different factor densities on exploratory innovation. The results show that: (1) At present, salary incentive for the chairman of state-owned enterprises significantly affects the output of exploratory innovation of state-owned enterprises, and equity incentive for the general manager is beneficial to promote the output of exploratory innovation;(2) Compared with general state-owned enterprises, salary incentive for the chairman of state-owned enterprises undergoing profound mixed ownership reform can significantly promote exploratory innovation, while the effect of salary incentive for the general manager is not significant, but equity incentive for the general manager can significantly promote exploratory innovation;(3) Compared with high-tech enterprises, salary incentive for the chairman of non-high-tech enterprises has a restraining effect on exploratory innovation activities, while the effect of salary incentive for the general manager is still not significant;however, compared with non-high-tech enterprises, equity incentive for the general manager of high-tech enterprises can significantly promote exploratory innovation.