摘要
运用最优控制理论构建非对称的双寡头博弈模型,揭示面对排污权价格变化企业的最优策略组合和经济效益,并仿真模拟。结果表明:排污权价格上涨对产量和经济效益的影响存在企业异质性;排污权价格与技术创新投资呈正向关系,且促进作用越来越强;排污权价格上涨有利于减少污染物的排放量。
This paper used optimal control theory to construct an asymmetric duopoly game model to reveal the optimal strategy combination and economic benefits of enterprises facing emission price change, and carried out simulation. The results show that the impact of emission price rise on output and economic benefits is heterogeneous, that the emission price has a positive relationship with technological innovation investment, and the promotion effect becomes stronger and stronger and that the rise of emission price is conducive to reducing the emission of pollutants.
作者
王树强
李盈
WANG Shu-qiang;LI Ying(School of Economics and Management,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401)
出处
《价格月刊》
北大核心
2021年第5期1-7,共7页
基金
天津科技计划项目重点招标项目“科技支撑天津环境与生态改善战略研究”(编号:17ZLDZF00130)
河北省高等学校人文社会科学研究项目“京津冀大气污染排放权初始分配机制及我省对策研究”(编号:SD171046)。
