融券卖空机制对标的上市公司违规行为的影响研究——审计师和分析师的中介作用检验

Research on the Influence of Being Short Selling Target of Securities Lending on Listed Companies'Violations——Intermediation Effect Tests of Auditors and Analysts

从融券卖空作为金融创新的市场交易机制入手,探究其抑制标的公司违规行为的潜在治理效应。基于截至2016年的融券卖空标的名单,采用基于倾向得分匹配的多时点双重差分模型,实证研究发现,融券卖空机制能够抑制标的上市公司的违规行为。采用中介效应模型的检验发现,外部市场的违规监督力量——审计师和分析师,均能够在融券卖空机制抑制标的上市公司违规行为方面发挥中介作用。进一步区分违规行为的类别和程度发现,融券卖空机制对标的公司的信息披露和经营类违规,以及对标的公司不同程度的违规,均具备显著抑制作用。研究结论丰富了融券卖空机制经济后果的理论,也有助于探寻上市公司违规防范的新有效途径,为监管部门进一步加强上市公司违规行为治理与监督提供了新思路。

Starting from short selling as a market trading mechanism of financial innovation,this paper explores the potential governance effect of short selling on company violations.Based on 2016 list of short selling target of securities selling and with Time-varying DID models based on PSM,empirical studies have found that being short selling target of securities selling can prohibit violations of listed companies,and auditors and analysts can play intermediary roles in the process.Further distinguishing the categories and degrees of violations,being short selling target of securities selling has a significant restraining effect on information disclosure and operating violations,as well as on different degrees of violations.The research conclusion enriches the theory of economic consequences of short seuing mechanism,and also helps to explore new ways to prevent violations of listed companies,and provides new ideas for the regulatory authorities to fur ther strengthen the go vernance and supervision of violations of listed companies.