董事高管责任保险促进还是抑制企业创新

Does Directors’and Officers’Liability Insurance Innovate or Suppress Enterprise Innovation

作为企业重要的治理机制,董事高管责任保险通过管理层风险偏好、管理水平及激励机制等因素进而影响企业创新,此影响过程究竟是促进还是抑制,尚存争论。基于沪深A股2007—2018年上市公司微观数据,实证研究了董事高管责任保险对企业创新的影响。研究发现:董事高管责任保险对企业创新存在显著的“创新激励”效应,特别是对创新产出和创新效率的提升作用明显,并在考虑控制内生性问题后,上述结论仍成立;企业高层的风险承受力与管理水平是董事高管责任保险对企业创新影响的重要机制和渠道,董事高管责任保险明显提高了管理层的风险承受力和管理能力,从而促进了企业创新;不同行业对“创新激励”效应存在显著的异质性,较高科技水平和竞争水平的行业“创新激励”效应更为明显。研究为完善上市公司治理结构,加快董事高管责任保险发展以促进企业创新具有重要的理论价值和政策意义。

As an important corporate governance mechanism,directors’and officers’liability insurance affects the level of enterprise innovation through the risk preference of management,management level and incentive mechanism.Whether this process can promote or inhibit is still controversial.Based on the micro data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares from 2007 to 2018,and empirically studies the impact of directors’and officers’liability insurance on corporate innovation.The results show as follows.Directors’and officers’liability insurance has significant“innovation incentive”effect on enterprise innovation,especially on the improvement of innovation output and innovation efficiency.After considering the endogenous problem of control,the above conclusion still holds.The risk tolerance and management level of senior executives are important mechanisms and channels of the impact of directors’and officers’liability insurance on enterprise innovation insurance significantly improves the risk tolerance and management ability of the management,and then promotes enterprise innovation.There is significant heterogeneity in the effect of“innovation incentive”in different industries,and the“innovation incentive”effect is more obvious in industries with higher technology level and competition level.In order to improve the governance structure of listed companies,accelerate the development of directors’and officers’liability insurance and promote enterprise innovation,it has important theoretical value and policy significance.