管理者过度自信、内部控制质量与商誉减值风险

Management overconfidence,internal control quality and goodwill impairment risk

巨额商誉减值不仅影响企业的经营业绩,还对投资者的利益造成了极大损害,现已成为企业、投资者和监管者重点防控的金融风险。以2014—2018年A股市场上发生并购并存在商誉减值的公司为样本,运用实证研究的方法对商誉减值的影响机制进行探讨。研究发现,管理者过度自信的程度越大,企业计提商誉减值的金额也越大;内部控制质量能抑制由管理者过度自信引发的商誉减值风险,并且此调节效应在国有企业中更显著。经过稳健性测试后,上述结论仍然成立。研究结果对企业与监督部门有一定的启示意义:(1)企业应完善管理者监督考核制度,优化企业内部环境。此外,管理者自身应加强自我修养,提高管理团队自我认识的水平,避免因个人主义、主观随意性产生的决策风险。(2)监管部门应完善相关法规、条例以提高并购交易信息披露的及时性与透明度,并对商誉的形成及后续的减值行为进行严格监管并加大问责力度。

The huge goodwill impairment not only affects the business performance,but also greatly infringes on the interests of investors,and has become a key financial risk for enterprises,investors and regulators to prevent and control.This paper takes M&A companies with goodwill impairment in Chinese stock market as research sample to explore the mechanism of goodwill impairment.The results show that managers’overconfidence has a strong effect on the impairment of goodwill,and the quality of internal control can inhibit the risk of goodwill impairment caused by managers’overconfidence.This moderating effect is more significant in state-owned enterprises.The research results of this paper have certain enlightenment for enterprises and supervisory departments:(1)Enterprises should improve the supervisory evaluation system of managers and optimize the internal environment of enterprises.In addition,managers should strengthen self-cultivation,improve the level of self-awareness of the management team,and avoid decision-making risks caused by individualism and subjective arbitrariness.(2)Regulatory authorities should improve relevant laws and regulations to improve the timeliness and transparency of information disclosure of M&A,and strictly supervise the formation of goodwill and subsequent impairment behaviors and increase accountability.