论休谟“必然性”概念的道德理论后果

On the Moral Theoretical Implication of Hume’s Concept of“Necessity”

对人类行动的一切合理的道德评价,都要求行动与行动者的意志、动机、性格和情感等因素之间存在一种必然联系.但休谟认为,除了相似对象的恒常会合与随之而来的心灵从一个对象向另一个对象进行推断的确定倾向之外,我们不能拥有任何必然概念或联系概念.因此,如果休谟是正确的,那么进行合理的道德评价的可能性将不复存在——因为恒常的会合与心灵进行某种推断的确定倾向这两个所谓“必然性的要素”并不是一切合理的道德评价所要求的那种必然联系.

Any moral judgments on human actions,if reasonable,all require that there are necessary connections between actions and will,motives,characters and disposition of the person who conducts these actions.Hume acknowledges this point,but he avers at the same time that beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects,and the consequent inference from one to the other,we have no notion of any necessity,or connection.According to logic,if Hume is right then his analysis of“necessity”will rule out the possibility of reasonable moral judgments which is based upon the concept of necessity,because the two“ingredients of necessity”Hume asserts-“constant conjunction”and the“inference”of our minds-are not the“necessity”required for us to make reasonable moral judgments.