摘要
关于康德内感觉理论,在对摩尔(Mohr)的经典阐释进行批评的基础上,中野裕考(Nakano Hirotaka)认为自我刺激是外感觉杂多被给予的条件,而后者在被给予的同时就被想象力的先验综合纳入到一个时间和空间的统一性里了。而且自我刺激以想象力的先验综合为前提,所以他认为不存在纯接受性地被给予的感性杂多。中野裕考认为接受性和自发性只是一个认知活动的两个方面,而不是两个独立的活动。从而在这个活动作用的过程中,不存在一个所谓“纯接受性的被给予”的中间产物。我认为,中野裕考忽视了内感觉、领会、注意和晦暗表象间的复杂关系。在本文里,我将对领会里的自我刺激进行新的重构,并且提出“感觉域—注意”阐释模型。在此基础上我们会发现,康德必然会假设纯接受性的被给予,并且后者确实是一种真实存在的心灵状态。
Based on a critique of Mohr’s classical interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of inner sense,H.Nakano considers self-affection the process in which the manifold of outer sense is both given and structured into the unity of space and time by the transcendental synthesis of imagination.Since selfaffection presupposes this transcendental synthesis,Nakano infers that there is no manifold given that is purely receptively given.According to him,receptivity and spontaneity are both aspects of a single cognitive activity rather than two independent acts.Thus,there is no“purely receptively given”that is conceived as an intermediate product between receptivity and spontaneity.I argue that Nakano fails to do justice to the intricate relations between inner sense,apprehension,attention and obscure representations.I then reconstruct the structure of self—affection in apprehension by means of a“perception field-attention”model.Based on this reconstruction,I claim that Kant must assume the purely receptively sensible given,which is an actual mental entity.
作者
梁亦斌
Liang Yibin(Beijing Normal University)
出处
《哲学评论》
CSSCI
2018年第2期25-40,共16页
Wuda Philosophical Review
基金
“中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助”。