CP论题能为本体论论证提供辩护吗?

Can the Ontological Argument Be Justified by Invoking the CP Thesis?

普兰汀格(A.Plantinga)为上帝的存在提供了一个本体论论证,但他并未为该论证的模态前提“可能必然地,全知全能全善的个体存在”提供任何辩护。在模态认识论的发展历史中,可设想性一直被当作通向可能性的可靠途径。本文旨在考察我们是否能利用“可设想性蕴涵可能性”原则(即CP论题)为普兰汀格的本体论论证提供支持。

A.Plantinga proposes an ontological argument demonstrating the existence of God.However,he does not provide any justification for its modal premise,which says that it is possible that it is necessary that an omniscient,omnipotent,and morally perfect individual exists.In the history of modal epistemology,conceivability has generally been regarded as a reliable guide to possibility.This paper aims at considering whether we can provide a justification for Plantinga’s ontological argument by invoking the CP thesis,which says that conceivability entails possibility.