超额商誉是否引起审计关注?——基于关键审计事项披露的研究视角

Does Excess Goodwill Raise Audit Concerns?——A Research Perspective Based on Disclosure of Key Audit Matters

近年来,超额商誉对公司价值及经营业绩的负面影响引起各界广泛关注,其中不乏学者对超额商誉的潜在风险进行研究,但是基于新审计准则视角的研究较少。对此,本文以2017—2019年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了超额商誉对关键审计事项披露的影响。研究发现:超额商誉会提高审计师对关键审计事项的披露数量和应对质量;经营风险和审计风险是超额商誉影响关键审计事项披露的重要渠道。进一步研究发现,关键审计事项的披露程度对公司管理层的盈余操纵具有一定的抑制作用。

In recent years,the negative impact of excess goodwill on corporate value and operating performance has attracted wide attention,many scholars have studied the potential risk of excess goodwill,but the research based on the new auditing standards is relatively rare.In this regard,this paper empirically examines the impact of excess goodwill on the disclosure of key audit items by using Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2017 to 2019 as the sample.The result shows that excess goodwill can improve the quantity and quality of auditors'disclosure of key audit items,while operational risk and audit risk are the important channels through which excess goodwill affects the disclosure of key audit items.Further research shows that the degree of disclosure of key audit items can restrain the earnings manipulation of management.