财政科技支出、地方政府行为与企业非效率投资

Fiscal Technology Expenditure,Local Government Behavior and Company Inefficient Investment

本文借助中国2008—2018年上市企业微观数据与宏观层面的财政科技支出变量,实证分析“财政科技支出—企业非效率投资”的影响关系。与既有研究不同,本文进一步嵌入地方政府行为的影响。研究发现,财政科技支出能够针对企业的非效率投资行为进行优化,对于非效率投资水平较高的企业而言,财政科技支出展现出更大的边际优化效果。财政科技支出对国有企业的非效率投资有明显抑制作用,而对民营企业的影响并不明显;对“高科技企业—非高科技企业”有明显的效率优化效果,对于非高科技企业这种抑制作用更明显。有效的政府激励制度是释放财政科技支出效力的重要条件。在较强的政府GDP竞争激励下,财政科技支出能展现出降低企业非效率投资的效果。本文的研究结论有助于优化财政科技支出,改进政府激励制度,以提高微观经济主体的运行效率。

This paper uses the micro data of China's listed companies from 2008 to 2018 and the macro-level fiscal technology expenditure variables to analyze the impact of“financial technology expenditure-company's inefficient investment”empirically.Unlike existing research,this article further embeds the influence of local government behavior.The paper found that fiscal technology expenditures can be optimized for companies'inefficient investment behavior.For companies with higher levels of inefficient investment,fiscal technology expenditures show greater marginal optimization effects.Fiscal technology expenditure has a significant inhibitory effect on the inefficient investment of state-owned companies,while its impact on private companies is not obvious.It has obvious efficiency optimization effects for“high-tech companies and non-high-tech companies”,and this restraining effect is even more obvious for technology companies.An effective government incentive system is an important condition for releasing the effectiveness of fiscal technology expenditures.With strong government GDP competition incentives,fiscal technology expenditures can show the effect of reducing company's inefficient investment.The conclusions are helpful to optimize fiscal technology expenditures,improve government incentive system,and improve the operating efficiency of microeconomic entities.