股权质押、融资约束与企业金融化

Equity Pledge,Financing Constraints and Corporate Financialization

选取2005-2019年沪深两市A股上市企业的非金融企业为样本,探究控股股东的股权质押行为与企业金融化的关系,研究表明,控股股东的股权质押行为会加剧企业金融化程度,且随着股权质押比例的增加,金融化程度也随之上升;控股股东股权质押通过加剧企业融资约束的中介路径来推升企业金融化水平;在融资约束较为严重的民营企业、监督和制约作用较弱的低股权集中度上市企业中,控股股东股权质押对企业金融化的推升作用较显著,说明完善的公司治理和大股东的监督能够起到约束管理层的积极作用。研究结论和政策建议一方面有利于防范企业"脱实向虚",另一方面对于资本市场股权质押业务的规范和金融风险管理有一定的借鉴意义。

Using a sample of non-financial enterprises among the companies in China’s A stock markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen between 2005 and 2009,we investigated the relationship between the equity pledge behavior of controlling shareholders and corporate financialization.We discovered that such an equity pledge would exacerbate corporate financialization and that the degree of financialization would rise with the increase in the ratio of equity pledge.Besides,the equity pledge of controlling shareholders can promote corporate financialization via the mediator of increased corporate financing constraints.Meanwhile,among private enterprises with severe financing constraints and listed companies with a low concentration of equity and weaker supervision and restriction,the equity pledge of controlling shareholders has a significant effect in enhancing corporate financialization.This suggests that improved corporate governance and supervision by major shareholders can effectively constrain the management.Our conclusions and policy suggestions serve to urge enterprises to work toward the real economy,as well as offer some insights on standardizing the equity pledge business in the capital market and managing financial risks.