差异化定价策略下政府规制对生产者尽规模式选择的影响

The Impacts of Government Regulation on Due Diligence Patterns of Producer under Differentiated Pricing Strategies

单寡头垄断生产者同时生产新产品和再制造品,政府通过规定最低循环率对生产者行为进行约束。首先,研究差异化定价策略下政府规制对生产者尽规模式选择的影响,即生产者责任实现情况;然后,探究两种定价策略下生产者尽规的实现方式;最后,分析生产者如何选择两种定价策略。研究结果表明,生产者有三种尽规模式,并得到各尽规模式之间的阈值;随着规制水平的提高,低定价策略下将通过扩大新产品和再制造品生产规模的方式实现尽规,而高定价策略则通过减少新产品产量和增加再制造品的产量的方式实现尽规;当绿色消费者比例较大时,应采取高定价策略,反之则应采取低定价策略。

The monopolistic producer manufactures both new and remanufactured products,while the government regulates the behavior of the producer by setting a minimum recycling rate.First,by considering the distribution of consumer types,the impact of the regulatory level on the producer due diligence patterns is explored,i.e.,the realization of the producer responsibility.Consequently,we explore the way to achieve due diligence under different pricing strategies.Finally,we analyze how the producer should choose the pricing strategy.The results show that the producer has three kinds of due diligence patterns,and thresholds between them are also obtained.With the increase of the regulation level,the producer will achieve due diligence by expanding production scale of both new and remanufactured products under low pricing strategy.While under the high pricing strategy,the producer achieves due diligence by reducing the output of new products and increasing the output of remanufactured products.Furthermore,when green consumers account for a larger proportion of the market,the producer should adopt high pricing strategy,otherwise,he should adopt low pricing strategy.