委托-代理理论视角下民办高校教师激励机制设计研究

Research on the Incentive Mechanism Design of the Teachers of Private Colleges and Universities from the Perspective of Principal-agent Theory

有效的激励机制是实现民办高校与教师发展目标的重要保障。实践中,激励机制设计时存在民办高校长期发展目标与短期效益目标冲突、激励措施未能匹配教师需求目标、激励力度不足以体现教师付出的人力资本价值、绩效考核难以有效引导教师行为等问题,此类问题制约了激励机制实施的效果。文章在委托-代理理论的视角下,对以上问题进行了阐释,并对民办高校激励机制设计的基础、完善激励机制的对策进行了理论探讨。文章的研究结果,为民办高校激励问题的理论研究与激励实践提供了借鉴。

An effective incentive mechanism is the important guarantee to realize the development goals of private universities and teachers.In practice,there are some problems in the design of incentive mechanism,such as the conflict between long-term development goal and short-term benefit goal,the failure of incentive measures to match teachers'demand goal,the insufficient incentive strength to reflect the human capital value paid by teachers,and the difficulty of performance appraisal to guide teachers'behavior effectively.In this paper,from the perspective of principal-agent theory,the above problems are explained,and the foundation of incentive mechanism design of private universities and the countermeasures to improve the incentive mechanism are discussed.The research results of this paper provide a reference for the theoretical research and incentive practice of the incentive problem of private universities.