自然类语词是范式语词吗?

Are Natural Kind Terms Paradigm Terms?

克里普克和普特南关于自然类语词的正统解释依赖两个重要假定:自然类语词的严格性与本质主义的形而上学,而这两个假定一直面临着巨大的争议和挑战。最近一种观点主张将自然类语词看作一种范式语词,其外延是被一种等价关系和现实世界中的具体对象所决定。范式语词的语义学一方面符合克里普克和普特南的语义框架,另一方面可以消解自然类语词的严格性问题和本质主义的形而上学要求,进而提供自然类语词的模态和认知特征的更合理解释。但是,范式语词语义学的困难是,等价关系和现实对象对于确定自然类语词的外延既不是充分的也不是必要的,它们也不能满足自然类语词是归纳上可投射的典型特征。自然类语词的外延仍然需要诉诸一种本质属性来决定,这种本质可以理解为事物内部动态变化过程中的稳定结构。

The orthodox account of natural kind terms proposed by Kripke and Putnam depends on two important assumptions:rigidity of natural kind terms and metaphysics of essentialism.These two assumptions have been faced with serious debates and challenges.Recently,there is a view claiming that natural kind terms are paradigm terms,and the extension of paradigm terms are determined by a specific equivalence relation and specific objects in actual world.The semantics of paradigm terms are not only in line with Kripke-Putnam’s semantic framework,but could resolve rigidity problem of natural kind terms and avoid the metaphysical requirement of essentialism.In this way,it can provide a more plausible explanation to the modal and epistemic features of natural kind terms.However,there are still various difficulties for the semantics of paradigm terms.On the one hand,equivalence relation and actual objects are neither sufficient nor necessary for determining the extension of natural kind terms,and on the other hand,the semantic model of paradigm terms cannot account for the widely attested feature of natural kind terms being inductively projectible.This paper argues that the extension of natural kind terms is still determined by an essence,which is best understood as a stable structure in dynamical change within things.