论霍布斯自然理性人性公设与意愿行为机械论解释的关系

On the Relationship Between Hobbes’s Postulate of Natural Reason and His Mechanical Account of Voluntary Actions

沃特金斯和戈蒂尔主张,在霍布斯的哲学体系中,暴死作为最大的恶的自然理性人性公设能够从霍布斯的对于意愿行为的机械论解释中引申或演绎出来。文章将对这种主张进行彻底批判。文章的三个部分依次论证和阐述三个命题:一,霍布斯对于意愿行为的机械论解释不可理解。二,即便假定意愿行为的机械论解释中包含特定意义的自我保存观念,从观念起源的角度讲,合理的看法也是,这个自我保存的观念先于意愿行为物理学的构造。三,即便假定意愿行为机械论解释中包含特定意义的自我保存观念,这个观念也和在霍布斯的道德-政治哲学中发挥作用的"自我保存"同名异义。

Watkins and Gauthier argue that Hobbes’s postulate of natural reason,which claims each man strives to avoid violent death as the supreme evil in nature,can be derived from his mechanical account of voluntary actions.This interpretive idea is critiqued through the demonstration of three propositions in the paper:first,Hobbes’s mechanical account of voluntary actions is unintelligible;second,even if the mechanical account implies a conception of self-preservation,this conception precedes Hobbes’s construction of the physics of voluntary actions;third,even if the mechanical account contains a conception of self-preservation,the conception is of a different meaning with the"self-preservation"which constitutes the foundation of Hobbes’s moral-political philosophy.