“大数据杀熟”该如何规制?——以新制度经济学和博弈论为视角的分析

The Regulation of Big-Data Driven Price Discrimination:An Analysis Based on New Institutional Economics and Game Theory

近年来,互联网零售端利用大数据技术实施算法歧视的“杀熟”行为引发诸多批评。大数据杀熟是经济学完全价格歧视行为的表象,体现了新制度经济学中买卖双方对信息产权的诉求。与“杀熟”的不道德直觉相反,大数据杀熟的定价机制将引发市场结构的调整和博弈规则的改变,消费者的谈判地位将得到提升,商家间的竞争将加剧,信息资源的配置将优化。鉴于此,建议对《电子商务法》第十八条算法歧视条款进行限缩解释。在市场机制能够自主完善的领域,法律应保持谦抑和包容。

The Big-data Driven Price Discrimination(BDPD)of the retail-end online shopping raises public concern on the welfare of the consumers.The article 18 of E-Commerce Law responses to this concern by stressing the information disclosing rights of the consumers.This practice,however,might not achieve in the algorithm-based market structure,in which the right to information property is the ultimate target for both of the contracting parties.This paper demonstrates a counter-intuitive market effect of the BDPD:it turns the table of the two sides by changing the rule of the game.The consumers get stronger in the negotiation with more efficient price information while the e-shops in turn,involve in a higher level of competition.We therefore suggest an exemption of BDPD by interpreting the Article 18 of E-Commerce Law restrictively,so as to foster market competition and efficient resource allocation in the context of information technology era.