双边道德风险中的产品质量与定价次序

Product Quality and Price Order in Double Moral Hazard

分析了企业和研究所在产研合作中的双边道德风险,并提出了一种改善措施.假设产品质量由双方努力水平共同决定,研究了一个多阶段博弈模型.企业先设计收益分享合同,然后双方同时付出努力,以提高产品质量,最后企业根据产品质量确定销售价格.与系统最优比较,均衡结果是双方努力不足,系统收益下降.发现提前定价可以改善系统效率,即企业在签约阶段就确定产品售价,则双方努力水平提高,系统收益增加.提前定价可以提高系统收益的原因是,产品售价对企业与研究所的努力有激励作用.最优提前定价低于系统最优定价,继续提高定价不能改善系统收益.

This paper analyzes the double moral hazardin the cooperation between a firm and a research institute,and puts forward an improvement measure.Assuming that the quality of product is determined by efforts of both parties,a multi-stage game model is studied.The firm first designsa revenue sharing contract,then both sides make efforts to improve product qualityat the same time,and finally the firm determines sale priceaccording to product quality.Compared with the system optimal result,the equilibrium result is that the two sides’ efforts are insufficient,and thus the system income drops.We found that pricing in advance can improve the efficiency of the system,that is,the firm determines the product pricein thecontract-signing stage,then two sides efforts are improved,and system revenue increases.Pricing in advance can increase the system revenue because the price of product motivates the efforts of both firm and research institute.Optimal advance pricing is lower than the optimal pricing of the system,and continuuous raising price cannot improve system revenue.