摘要
在新著《分配正义新论:人道与公平》中,葛四友教授批评了包括罗尔斯的作为公平的正义理论在内的主流义务论,指出在人性动机和道德直觉的讨论中,义务论不如后果论有说服力。由此,他创新性地从后果论出发,证成一种新的正义观念。本文认为,他在方法论上对“初定的”和“初步的”之不同意涵的区分,有助于我们厘清关于平等价值之论争的本质。但是,他对罗尔斯有关自我所有权和道德动机的批评是有问题的,后者拥有更好的理论资源和空间为自己辩护。在这个基础上,本文亦指出,葛四友对罗尔斯理论的重构也值得商榷。当我们澄清罗尔斯暗含的基本需要原则作为绝对优先原则,再融合两个正义原则,同样能很好地实现葛四友提出的分配正义目标,即人道与公平。
In his newly published book“A New Account of Distributive Justice:Humaneness and Fairness”,the author professor Ge Siyou criticized those mainstream deontic theories including justice as fairness posed by John Rawls.Based on pointing out their weakness in moral incentives in real world,Ge Siyou tried to justify a new kind of conception of justice within the framework of consequentialism.After making use of his distinction of prima facie and pro tanto to clarify the nature in debating on the value of equality,the article then argues that his criticism of Rawls’theory of justice is problematic and unsound.As long as we recognize that the basic need principle,which takes lexical priority over,and would combine with Rawls’another two principles of justice,is implied in Justice as fairness,Rawls’theory is more defendable than what Ge Siyou criticized of.
作者
徐峰
Xu Feng(East China Normal University,210044)
出处
《哲学评论》
2020年第1期229-244,共16页
Wuda Philosophical Review
基金
上海市哲学社会科学规划青年项目“当代西方平等主义理论研究”(2017EZX007)
中国博士后第11批特别资助项目“当代分配理论中的平等主义研究”(2018T110376)
中央高校科研业务费华东师范大学人文社科青年跨学科创新团队项目(2018ECNU-QKT011)的联合资助。
关键词
平等价值
自我所有
道德动机
作为公平的正义
the value of equality
Self-Ownership
Moral Incentives
Justice as Fairness