控股股东股权质押与实体企业金融化——基于“掏空”与控制权转移的视角

Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge and Real Enterprise Financialization——From the Perspective of Tunneling and the Risk of Losing Control Rights

本文从股权质押的视角切入,基于2007-2016年A股上市公司的经验数据,探究控股股东股权质押对实体企业金融化的影响。研究发现:控股股东股权质押比例与实体企业金融化呈倒U型关系,即随着股权质押比例的增加,企业持有金融资产的比例先增后减。该结论在进行一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。此外,进一步识别了在股权质押下控股股东的"掏空"动机与规避控制权转移风险动机。在金融化偏好检验中发现,控股股东股权质押后更可能促使企业配置具有投机性的、容易变现的短期金融资产,从而规避金融资产价格波动风险。在经济后果检验中发现,股权质押比例较高时,企业会持有更多现金以预防不利情况。本文研究结论对于政府部门加强监管、控股股东专注于企业长远发展和投资者做出合理投资决策均有一定的启示意义。

From the perspective of equity pledge, based on the experience data of A-share listed companies in 2007-2016,this paper explores the impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on the financing of real enterprises.It is found that: the proportion of equity pledge of the controlling shareholder and the proportion of financial assets hold are inverted U-shaped, that is, there may be a critical value between the proportion of equity pledge and the proportion of financial assets hold.When the proportion of equity pledge is on the left side of the critical value, the controlling shareholder can promote the enterprise to increase the proportion of financial assets hold out of"hollowing out"motivation;when the proportion of equity pledge is on the right side of the critical value In order to avoid the risk of control transfer, the controlling shareholders may urge the enterprise to reduce the proportion of financial assets.After the robustness test, the conclusion is still valid.In the motivation identification test, based on the degree of equity balance and the nature of property rights, this paper further identifies the"tunneling"motivation of controlling shareholders and the motivation to avoid the transfer of control rights under the equity pledge.In the test of financial preference, it is found that the pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity is more likely to promote the allocation of speculative and easy to realize short-term financial assets.In the economic consequence test, it is found that when the equity pledge ratio is low, the increase of financial assets will"crowd out"innovation investment and reduce the cash holding level;when the equity pledge ratio is high, the disposal of financial assets by enterprises does not increase innovation investment, but holds more cash to prevent adverse situation.The conclusion of this paper has some enlightenment for the supervision department to strengthen supervision, the controlling shareholders to focus on the long-term development of enterprises and investors to make reasonable investment decisions.