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基于机制设计的价格歧视最优定价问题

Optimal pricing with price discrimination based on mechanism design theory
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摘要 针对由垄断者和两种类型消费者组成的销售博弈问题,通过适当的机制设计,对顾客进行价格歧视,分两个阶段进行销售商品,最终进行清仓.在开始阶段对不同类别产品制定不同的最优定价,进一步考虑商家的订货量,以获得最大的销售利润.最后,在此基础上研究了影响商家销售利润的一些因素,并在需求函数为均匀分布的情况下,通过数值算例验证了这一结果. Aiming at the sales game composed of monopolist and two types of consumers,this paper discriminated against customers by price through appropriate mechanism design theory,and then sold goods in two period,and finally cleared the warehouse.In the initial period,made different optimal pricing for different types of products.Furthermore,this paper considered the order quantity of the merchant,so as to obtain the maximum sales profit.Finally,based on this,some factors that affect the sales profit were studied,and the results were verified by numerical examples when the demand function was uniformly distributed.
作者 高霁云 郭永江 GAO Ji-yun;GUO Yong-jiang(School of Science,Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Beijing 100876,China)
出处 《哈尔滨商业大学学报(自然科学版)》 CAS 2021年第3期345-350,共6页 Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Natural Sciences Edition
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目:基于流逼近的排队网络的渐近震荡和优化分析(11871116)资助。
关键词 多类顾客 机制设计 价格歧视 报童模型 最优定价 multi class customers mechanism design theory price discrimination newsvendor problem optimal pricing
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