董事会治理、股权结构与商业银行自愿性信息披露研究

Board Governance, Equity Structure and Voluntary Information Disclosure of Commercial Banks

基于上市银行2012-2019年的数据分析董事会治理对中国商业银行自愿性信息披露的影响,结果发现,自愿性信息披露与独立董事比例显著负相关,而与董事会成员薪酬水平以及独立董事与商业银行工作地点一致性显著正相关。这说明注重董事会的独立性的同时不能忽略董事成员的信息获取成本,否则不利于自愿性信息披露水平的提高。同时,适度的股权集中有助于自愿性信息披露水平的提高,但大股东持股比例不宜过高。机构持股也能显著提高自愿性信息披露水平,并有利于董事会治理作用的发挥。

Based on the data of listed banks during the year 2012 to 2019,the paper explores the impact of board governance on voluntary information disclosure.It’s found that voluntary information disclosure is negatively correlated with the proportion of independent directors,but positively correlated with the salary level of board members and the consistency of working place between independent directors and commercial banks.This shows that while paying attention to the independence of the board of directors,we can’t ignore the information acquisition cost of the board members;otherwise it is not conducive to the improvement of the level of voluntary information disclosure.At the same time,moderate concentration of equity is helpful to improve the level of voluntary information disclosure,but the proportion of large shareholders should not be too high.Institutional ownership can also significantly improve the level of voluntary information disclosure,and is conducive to the governance role of the board of directors.