大股东异质性、退出威胁与财务报告质量——基于我国融资融券制度的自然实验

Blockholder Heterogeneity,Exit Threats and Financial Reporting Quality:A Natural Experiment on the Chinese Margin Trading Program

本文基于我国融资融券制度,采用双重差分模型检验大股东退出威胁对财务报告质量(FRQ)的治理效应及大股东异质性的影响。研究发现,退出威胁能有效提升FRQ,但会因大股东异质性而存在差异,具体表现为大股东数量越多、总体持股比例越高,退出威胁对FRQ的提升越显著;相比国有大股东(个人大股东),非国有大股东(机构大股东)退出威胁更能提升FRQ。进一步分析发现,非国有性质的企业更利于大股东退出威胁发挥治理作用;大股东可能的退出行为对管理层和控股股东均能产生威胁;退出可信度更强时退出威胁的治理效应越强;当管理层持股以及控股股东财富更为集中时,退出威胁的治理效应越强。本文研究对企业优化股东构成以及融资融券的扩容具有一定启示。

Based on the implementation of China’s margin financing and securities lending system,this paper uses DID model to verify the governance effect of the exit threat of blockholders and the impact of the blockholder heterogeneity on the governance effect.We found that the exit threats can improve the financial reporting quality,but will be affected by blockholder heterogeneity.the greater the number of blockholders and the higher the proportion of shares,the more significant the effect of exit threats on the FRQ.Compared with state-owned blockholders and individual blockholders,the exit threat of non-state-owned blockholders and institutional blockholders has a more significant effect on the FRQ.Further analysis shows that the exit threat of blockholders has a more significant effect on the FRQ in non-SOE enterprises.Blockholders can improve the FRQ by both threatening the managers and the controlling shareholder.The stronger exit credibility is,the stronger the governance effect of exiting threats is.When the management shareholding and the wealth of controlling shareholders are more concentrated,the governance effect of exit threat is stronger.This study has implications for the optimization of corporate shareholder composition and the expansion of margin financing and securities lending.