盈余管理、信息披露与再次被收购

Earnings Management,Information Disclosure and Being Acquired Again

基于上市公司多次被收购这一现象,本文以2007-2015年我国发生并购的上市公司为研究样本,探讨了盈余管理对企业再次被收购概率及并购后绩效的影响,以及企业履行信息披露义务发挥的作用。研究发现:(1)公司盈余管理提高了再次被收购的可能性,被收购取得的短期绩效更好但长期绩效更差。(2)公司积极履行信息披露义务会削弱盈余管理与再次被收购概率及并购后市场反应之间的正向关系、削弱盈余管理与再次被收购后长期绩效之间的反向关系。(3)中介效应分析结果表明,盈余管理程度越高的企业,分析师跟踪程度越高,因而再次被收购的可能性越大。本文丰富了目标公司特征的研究,同时对并购重组信息披露管理办法及市场中介监管条例的制定具有参考价值。

Based on the phenomenon of multiple acquisitions of listed companies in China,this paper takes listed companies in China from 2007 to 2015 as research samples to discuss the impact of earnings management on the probability of being acquired again and the M&A performance,as well as the role played by enterprises in fulfilling their information disclosure obligations.The result shows that:(1)Corporate earnings management increases the probability of being acquired again,with better short-term performance but worse long-term performance.(2)Enterprises actively fulfill information disclosure obligations will weaken the positive relationship between earnings management and the probability of being acquired again as well as the market reaction after acquisition,and weaken the negative relationship between earnings management and long-term performance after being acquired again.(3)The results of the mediating effect analysis show that the higher the degree of earnings management,the higher the degree of analyst tracking,and thus the greater the possibility of being acquired again.This paper enriches the research on the characteristics of the target companies,and has reference value for the formulation of the M&A information disclosure management measures and market intermediary supervision regulations.