成本信息不对称下PPP项目激励机制研究

Research on the Incentive Mechanism of PPP Project under Cost Information Asymmetry

针对PPP项目中私营企业运营成本存在异质性的特点,研究了抑制私营企业谎报成本信息的激励机制设计问题。通过建立委托代理模型,设计以价格补偿为激励措施的最优激励合同,使得私营企业谎报成本信息获得的收益不高于实报成本信息获得的收益,从而激励私营企业显示其真实的成本信息,进一步分析企业类型分布对最优激励合同的影响。研究表明:该激励机制能够实现对私营企业成本信息的甄别,且私营企业的收费价格和政府部门的价格补偿与企业类型分布有关,促进企业之间的竞争有利于抑制私营企业攫取信息租金。

Aiming at the heterogeneity of operation costs around private enterprises in PPP projects,this study designs the incentive mechanism to restrain private enterprises from misreporting cost information.This study establishes a principal-agent model.Through designing of the optimal contract that takes price compensation as the incentive measure,the gain of private enterprises by claiming false cost information is not greater than that of reporting his true cost information,which can encourage private enterprises to show their true cost information.Then,we further analyze the influence of enterprise type distribution on the optimal incentive contract.Results show that the incentive mechanism can screen the cost information of private enterprises.In addition,the charge price of private enterprises and the price compensation of government departments are related to the distribution of enterprise types.And the promotion of competition among enterprises will inhibit private enterprises from seizing information rent.