承销商新股自主配售行为探析

An Exploration of Underwriters’ IPO Allocations Behavior of New Shares

自主配售是询价制下实施的股票定价和配售制度,承销商在新股发行中如何分配股票是影响新股定价效率的一个关键问题。本文对市场化机制下承销商新股自主配售行为进行了较为深入的研究,指出其行为本质是相关主体基于利益得失考虑进行的多方利益博弈,并进一步分析了新股自主配售的行为导向和不当行为的具体表现。在此基础上,本文结合发行注册制改革,提出了优化承销商声誉制衡机制与法律约束机制的建议。

IPO allocation is a stock pricing and allocation system implemented under the inquiry system, and how underwriters allocate shares in IPOs is a key issue that affects the efficiency of IPO pricing. This paper conducts an in-depth study on underwriters’ IPO allocation behavior of new shares under the market-based mechanism, pointing out that the nature of their behavior is a game of multiple interests based on the consideration of gain and loss of interests of relevant subjects, and further analyzes the behavioral orientation of IPO allocation of new shares and the specific manifestations of improper behavior. On this basis, this paper proposes suggestions for optimizing underwriters’ reputation check and balance mechanism and legal restraint mechanism in conjunction with the issue registration system reform.