环境规制促进企业绿色技术创新的政策仿真研究

A Policy Simulation Analysis on the Effects of Environmental Regulation on Enterprise’s Green Innovation in Technology

本文基于政府干预的演化博弈视角,提出了解决绿色技术创新市场失灵的多重利益交错和各种政策工具交织的研究假设,构建了市场激励型环境规制政策工具促进企业绿色技术创新的非合作演化博弈模型,开展了单一环境规制政策工具的有效性和多种政策工具组合交互性的政策仿真。研究发现,渐进提高环境税征收和创新专项补贴政策效果更优,政府必要监管强度下激励型环境规制工具促进企业绿色技术创新的理想演化稳定均衡更容易实现。进一步在考虑企业创新水平和知识产权保护的科技政策情景、环境税改革结合宏观税负的税收政策情景的仿真表明,政府实施激励型环境规制工具促进企业绿色技术创新存在“帕累托改进”政策效果。

Based on the perspective on evolutionary game of government intervention,this paper proposes research hypotheses to solve the market failure of green innovation in technology,a non-cooperative evolutionary game is employed to conduct policy simulations to promote enterprise's green innovation in technology by means of incentive-based environmental regulation.Numerical simulations show that the policy of gradually increasing environmental tax collection combined with the special subsidy for innovation are more effective than policies implemented separately.Therefore,it is easier for the government to achieve the ideal evolutionarily stable equilibrium of policy control target,in which enterprises motivated by incentive-based environmental regulation are willing to pursue green innovation in technology under government's necessary regulatory intensity.In addition,three explorative scenarios are investigated with regard to the level of corporate innovation and intellectual property protection,and the environmental tax reform combined with macro tax burdens of enterprises.It is found that the policy control target of government intervention would be Pareto improved when these long-term aspirations are embraced.