考虑专用零件与政府补贴的再制造决策研究

Research on Remanufacturing Decision Considering Proprietary Parts and Government Subsidies

本文探究了再制造商和零售商的共谋策略并结合无限期重复博弈分析了制造商生产时使用的专用零件和政府对再制造的补贴在博弈中的作用。研究发现,零售商和再制造商的共谋会抑制再制造而促进新品的生产销售。原制造商使用更多的专用零件能够有效遏制再制造产品与新品的竞争,而下游的共谋使得专用零件对再制造产品的抑制作用增大,因此更高的专用零件比例能够促使再制造商背离共谋。政府补贴促进了再制造,降低两种产品的售价并提升消费者剩余。更多的政府补贴能够削弱零售商参与共谋的动机,因为政府补贴在下游共谋时能够更有效地推广再制造。

This paper explores tacit collusion of remanufacturer and retailer,analyzing the impact of government subsidies and original manufacturer's use of proprietary parts.It is found that tacit collusion between retailer and remanufacturer will inhibit remanufacturing and promote the production and sales of new products.The original manufacturer's use of more proprietary parts can effectively curb the competition between remanufactured products and new products,while downstream collusion makes proprietary parts more restrictive to remanufactured products.So a larger proportion of proprietary parts can prevent remanufacturer from collusion.Government subsidies promote remanufacturing,lower the prices of two products and increase consumer surplus.More government subsidies can weaken retailer's incentive to participate in collusion,because government subsidies can more effectively promote remanufacturing and inhibit new products when downstream colluding.