激励机制错位矫正与企业全要素生产率提升研究

Research on the Correction of Incentive Mechanism Dislocation and the Improvement of Enterprise Total Factor Productivity

以沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,探讨了激励机制错位这一系统性问题对企业全要素生产率所产生的影响。研究结果表明:激励机制错位抑制企业全要素生产率增长,而这一影响在经过变量替换、样本重置等稳健性测试之后依然存在。进一步的机制检验发现,激励机制错位之所以负向影响全要素生产率,原因在于其增加了代理成本,并且降低了研发产出。调节机制检验也进一步证明,提高内部控制质量以及一定的股权集中度能够缓解激励机制错位的负面效应。此外,激励机制错位对于全要素生产率的抑制效应,在成熟期与衰退期企业中更为显著。

Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges as research samples, this study discusses the impact of malposition incentives for businesses systemic issues arising from total factor productivity. The results show that the malposition of incentive mechanism inhibits the growth of total factor productivity, and this effect still exists after the robustness tests such as variable replacement and sample reset. Further mechanism tests find that the reason why incentive mechanism dislocation negatively affects total factor productivity may be that it increases agency cost and reduces R&D output. The regulation mechanism test shows that improving the quality of internal control and a certain degree of ownership concentration can alleviate the negative effects of the misalignment of incentive mechanism. In addition, the inhibitory effect of the dislocation of incentive mechanism on the improvement of total factor productivity is more significant in the period of maturity and recession.