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地方政府推动林权抵押贷款的演化博弈分析 被引量:7

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Forest Right Mortgage Loan Promoted by Local Government
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摘要 通过构建地方政府和金融机构的博弈模型,分析地方政府与金融机构在开展林权抵押贷款过程中的演化博弈过程。结果表明:地方政府出台林权抵押贷款支持政策对推动商业银行开展林权抵押贷款业务具有必要性和可行性;地方政府对林权抵押贷款出台各种有利于弥补商业银行风险损失的支持政策能在一定程度上增加商业银行开展林权抵押贷款的积极性,从而促使地方政府与商业银行双方的策略收敛于出台支持政策、开展林权抵押贷款的稳定状态。为进一步实现地方政府推动林权抵押贷款的目的,鼓励更多的金融机构提供林权抵押贷款,提出了完善林权抵押贷款相关法律法规、构建科学的林权抵押贷款激励机制、建立健全的林权抵押贷款考核目标等政策建议。 ⑴Background——The business of forest right mortgage loan is still facing great practical difficulties.How the government improve the current policy to stimulate the enthusiasm of financial institutions to carry out forest right mortgage loan is a key problem to be solved urgently.⑵Methods——In this paper,the evolutionary game model is used to analyze the choice of forest right mortgage loan strategy of repeated game between local government and financial institutions under the condition of incomplete information.⑶Results——When R-H-T>0 and L-U-C>0,the evolutionary stable strategy(ESS)of the game model is for the government to issue support policies and banks to carry out forest right mortgage loans.At this time,the net income of commercial banks carrying out forest right mortgage loan is higher than the possible risk loss,and the income of local government issuing forest right mortgage loan supporting policies is higher than that not issuing the supporting policies.Both of them can benefit from the introduction of forest rights mortgage support policy.When R-H-T>0 and L-U-C<0,the evolutionary stable strategy(ESS)of the game model is that the government not issuing supporting policies,and banks carrying out forest right mortgage loan.Meanwhile,the net income of commercial banks carrying out forest right mortgage loans is higher than its possible risk loss,but the income of local government issuing the forest right mortgage loan supporting policies is lower than that of not issuing the supporting policies.When R-H-T<0 and L-U-C>0,the evolutionary stable strategy(ESS)of the game model will change from the government supporting policies,the banks carrying out the forest right mortgage loan to the government not issuing the supporting policies and the banks not carrying out the forest right mortgage loan,indicating that the introduction of forest right mortgage loan policy by banks is not only related to their own benefits,but also related to whether commercial banks actively respond to the policies issued by the government.When R-H-T<0 and L-U-C>0,the evolutionary stable strategy(ESS)of the game model is that the government not issuing supporting policies,and banks not carrying out forest right mortgage loan.The results showed that the local government and banks could not obtain incomes from the forest right mortgage loan before they establish a sound forest property mortgage loan system.⑷Conclusions and Discussions——Whether the local government issues forest right mortgage loan support policy has a significant impact on further promoting commercial banks to carry out forest right mortgage loan business.When the non-performing rate of forest right mortgage increases and the net income obtained decreases,the enthusiasm of banks to carry out forest right mortgage will be greatly reduced.Only when the local government issues supporting policies to ensure the safety and liquidity of commercial banks to carry out forest right mortgage,can the willingness of commercial banks to carry out forest right mortgage be enhanced,so as to ensure the evolutionary game system be in equilibrium.In order to encourage more financial institutions to provide forest right mortgage loans,this paper puts forward some policy suggestions,such as perfecting the relevant laws and regulations of forest right mortgage loan,constructing scientific incentive mechanism of forest right mortgage loan,establishing and perfecting the assessment index of forest right mortgage loan and so on.
作者 王强强 戴永务 刘丰波 武千雯 孙于岚 WANG Qiangqiang;DAI Yongwu;LIU Fengbo;WU Qianwen;SUN Yulan(College of Economics,Fujian Agricultural and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China;College of Management,Fujian Agricultural and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China;Research Center for Collective Forestry Reform and Development of New Type of Think Tank With Characteristics in Fujian Universities,Fuzhou 350002,China)
出处 《林业经济问题》 北大核心 2021年第4期424-431,共8页 Issues of Forestry Economics
基金 国家林草局经济发展研究中心委托项目(JYC2019-73) 福建省社会科学规划项目一般项目(FJ2019B090)。
关键词 林权抵押贷款 演化博弈 地方政府 雅可比矩阵 forest right mortgage evolutionary game analysis local governments Jacobian matrix
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