高管薪酬激励的团队协同与审计费用

Top Management Team Incentive Dispersion and Audit Fees

高管团队成员之间薪酬业绩敏感系数代表激励强度,而其离散程度则可以衡量高管薪酬激励中的团队协同性。研究发现,审计费用与高管团队激励强度的离散程度正相关。当离散程度向最优水平回归时,审计费用随之减少;而当其相悖于最优水平偏离时,审计费用随之增加。路径检验发现,上述结果主要通过影响审计师感知到的业务风险和审计风险这一机制而达成。同时,研究没有发现通过购买审计意见影响审计费用的证据。进一步研究发现,公司所处的外部竞争环境起到了重要的调节作用。本文在理论上丰富了审计费用影响因素的研究,在实践上不仅有助于加深对高管薪酬设计中团队协同动机的理解,而且有助于增强对高管薪酬信息披露经济意义的认识。

The dispersion of the pay-performance sensitivities within the top management team(TMT)measures the degree of incentive dispersion.This paper finds that audit fees are positively correlated with TMT’s incentive dispersion.When the incentive dispersion approaches the optimal level,the audit fees decrease;and when the incentive dispersion deviates from the optimal level,the audit fees increase accordingly.Path tests show that the impact of the TMT’s incentive dispersion on audit fees comes through the channel of influencing the business risk and audit risk perceived by the auditors.At the same time,the path tests do not provide evidence that the TMT’s incentive dispersion affects audit fees through the channel of audit opinion shopping.Firms’external competitive environment moderates the positive correlation between the TMT’s incentive dispersion and audit fees.Our findings not only enrich the literature on the determinants of audit fees,but also deepen the understanding of the team incentive embedded in executive compensation,as well as the understanding of the economic significance of enhancing the executive compensation disclosure.