审计收费、CEO风险偏好与企业违规

Audit Pricing,CEO’s Risk Preference and Corporate Fraud

CEO风险偏好对企业违规的影响尚不明确。鉴于此,本文以2010~2018年沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证检验CEO风险偏好与企业违规的关系及审计收费的调节作用。结果表明:由风险偏好型CEO任职的企业违规倾向更高,审计收费策略能够削弱企业的违规倾向;进一步将企业违规分类为信息披露违规、经营违规与领导人违规交易,研究发现,CEO风险偏好程度仅与企业的经营违规倾向显著正相关,审计收费策略仅显著削弱企业领导人的违规倾向;机制检验结果表明,审计收费负向调节作用的发挥主要源于审计投入的增加,降低审计师收取过高风险溢价致使审计收费治理效应失灵的可能性。本研究为审计师和监管部门从CEO风险特质的角度监控企业违规倾向提供了理论依据。

The impact of CEO’s risk preference on corporate fraud is unclear.In view of this,this paper takes the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2018 as sample to test the relationship between CEO’s risk preference and corporate fraud,as well as the moderating effect of audit pricing.The empirical results show that the higher CEO’s risk preference,the higher companies’tendency to fraud,and that the audit pricing strategy can significantly weaken corporate fraud tendency.By further dividing corporate fraud into information disclosure fraud,corporate operating fraud and personal transaction fraud,it is found that the degree of CEO’s risk preference only positively affects the tendency towards business operating fraud,while external audit pricing strategy only significantly weakens CEO’s tendency towards transaction fraud.The mechanism shows that the negative moderating effect of audit pricing is mainly due to the increase in audit effort,which reduces the possibility that the auditor’s excessively high risk premium will cause the governance effect of audit pricing to fail.This paper provides theoretical basis for auditors and the regulatory authorities to monitore corporate fraud tendency from the perspective of CEO’s risk preference.