内部代理、集团共同审计与资本配置效率

Internal Agency Problem,Business Group Common Auditor and Capital Allocation Efficiency

企业集团的内部代理结构会影响内部信息传递效率。本文从信息传递视角考察了共同审计对企业集团资本配置效率的优化作用。以2006~2017年隶属集团上市公司为样本,研究发现:当成员上市公司与集团总部聘用同一会计师事务所时,其资本配置效率显著提升;且这一提升作用在集团上市公司产权性质为国有、多元化程度较高、聘用会计师事务所为"十大"以及共同审计师覆盖范围更广时更显著。进一步分析发现,上市公司与集团总部共享同一会计师事务所降低了其应计盈余管理。本研究考察了企业集团运作效率的影响因素,探究了外部信息中介对内部市场的治理作用,为共同审计的功能发挥提供了经验证据,为企业集团资本配置效率问题提供了新的研究视角。

The internal agency structure of a business group can affect the internal information transfer efficiency.From the perspective of information transfer,this paper examines the optimization effect of common auditor on the capital allocation efficiency of business groups.Based on data of the 2006-2017 listed companies,our research finds that when a listed subsidiary and its group headquarters employ the same accounting firm,the capital allocation efficiency can be significantly improved.This effect is more pronounced when the listed companies are state-owned,more diversified with"Big Ten"common auditors covering multiple subsidiaries.Further examination shows that the sharing of the same accounting firm by a listed subsidiary and its group headquarters can reduce accrued earnings management.This study examines the factors affecting business groups’operating efficiency,explores the external information intermediaries’governance function on the internal market,provides empirical evidence for common auditor,and shows a new research perspective on business group capital allocation efficiency.