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基于消费者偏好的双渠道生鲜供应链协调与优化 被引量:3

Coordination and Optimization of Dual Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain Based on Consumer Preference
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摘要 以线上、线下统一价为背景,考虑由供应商主导的双渠道两级生鲜供应链,生鲜产品需求量受促销水平以及产品新鲜水平影响.运用Stackelberg博弈理论构建了集中决策(FC模式)、线下促销费用不分担独立决策(FS模式)和线下促销费用共担独立决策(FT模式)博弈模型,求解得到三种模式下的线上、线下促销水平、生鲜产品的新鲜水平、供应商分担线下促销费用比例等均衡解.主要结论如下:(1)FT模式在线下促销努力水平、总需求量、供应链成员及系统利润方面均优于FS模式;(2)FT模式下线上、线下促销水平与促销水平对本渠道和替代渠道的直接影响系数正相关,交叉影响系数负相关;且分别与线上、线下促销努力成本系数负相关;(3)供应商可以引入先进的保鲜设备及方法,降低保鲜成本,通过学习线上推广和移动互联网技术,提高线上促销的精准性,提升线上生鲜产品的销售量.零售商可以根据线下消费者群体的心理和期望,进行有针对性的营销和推广,提升线下生鲜产品的销售量.最后运用算例分析进一步验证了模型的有效性. Based on the background of unity price online and offline,a dual channel two level fresh supply chain consisting of a leading suppliers is considered,the fresh products demand are affected by the promotion level and product freshness level.The Stackelberg game theory is used to construct a centralized decision making(FC mode),a offline promotion costfree sharing decentralized decision making(FS model) and a offline promotion cost sharing decentralized decision making(FT model) game model.The equilibrium solutions of online and offline promotion level,freshness level of fresh products and proportion of suppliers’ sharing offline promotion costs are obtained.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)FT mode is superior than the FS mode in promotion effort level,total demand,supply chain members and system profit;(2) The promotion level of online and offline is positively correlated with the direct influence coefficient of promotion level on the channel and alternative channel when negatively related tothe cross influence coefficient,and is negatively correlated with the effort cost coefficient of online and offline promotion respectively in FT mode;(3)Suppliers can introduce advanced preservation equipment and methods,reduce the cost of preservation,improve the accuracy of online promotion and increase the sales of online fresh products by learning online promotion and mobile Internet technology.Retailers can carry out targeted marketing and promotion according to the psychology and expectation of offline consumers,so as to improve the sales of offline fresh products.Finally,a numerical example is given to further demonstrate the validity of the models.
作者 王刚 WANG Gang(School of Management,Guizhou University of Commerce,Guiyang 550014,China)
出处 《数学的实践与认识》 2021年第12期69-81,共13页 Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金 贵州商学院科研项目(2020YJSK006) 2021年度贵州省理论创新课题(联合课题(GZLCLH-2021-530))。
关键词 消费者偏好 双渠道生鲜供应链 成本分担 STACKELBERG博弈 consumer preference dual channel fresh supply chain cost sharing Stackelberg game
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