摘要
基于制造商和零售商构成的二级双渠道供应链系统,以及系统中的单一主体多决策问题,构建了制造商主导和零售商主导的Stackclbcrg博弈、Hotelling博弈、集中式决策等四种权力结构下的二级双渠道供应链决策模型,并分别探讨了四种权力结构下,制造商努力成本系数和消费者异质偏好对系统决策的影响机理。研究发现:(1)相较于其他三种权力结构,集中式决策模式下的系统总利润总是最优的,并有利于制造商提升线上努力水平,优化服务流程;但是,如果制造商和零售商间缺乏必要的收益再分配契约,将导致道德风险问题的产生;(2) Stackclbcrg博弈过程中,对于制造商而言,零售商主导总是最优的;但对于零售商而言,优劣关系取决于制造商努力成本系数和消费者异质偏好结构的变化;(3)随着制造商努力成本系数的增加,制造商的线上产品定价、努力水平以及零售商利润、线下产品定价一致单调递减,因此,本研究所构建的供应链决策模型均有利于促使零售商辅助制造商优化线上服务流程,降低线上努力成本系数;(4)随着消费者线下消费偏好的增加,制造商的线上产品定价、努力水平一致单调递减,而零售商线下产品定价的单调性受到不同权力结构下需求函数中交叉弹性系数、制造商努力成本系数、产品线上需求对制造商努力水平的敏感系数等四个参数间逻辑关系的影响。
In light of the problem featured by single-subject multi-decision-making in the two-echelon dual-channel supply chain system composed of manufacturers and retailers, this study constructs the decision-making model of two-echelon dual-channel supply chain under four power structures-namely,manufacturer-led and retailer-led Stackclberg game,Hotelling game and centralized decision-making-and discusses the influence mechanism of manufacturers’ effort cost coefficient and consumer heterogeneous preference coefficient on system decision-making under the four power structures.The research results indicated that:(1) compared with the other three power structures, the total profit of the system under the centralized decision-making mode is always optimal,and it is beneficial for manufacturers to improve the echelon of online efforts and optimize the service process;however,a lack of necessary income redistribution contract between manufacturers and retailers will lead to moral hazard problems;(2) in the process of Stackclbcrg game, the leadership of retailers is always optimal for manufacturers;however,for retailers,the relationship between the good and the bad depends on the change of manufacturers ’ effort cost coefficient and consumers’ heterogeneous preference structure;(3) Along with the increase of the manufacturers’ effort cost coefficient, the manufacturers ’ online product pricing, effort echelon, retailers’ profit and offline product pricing arc decreasing unanimously;therefore, the supply chain decision-making model constructed in this study is beneficial to urge retailers to assist manufacturers to optimize online service process and reduce online effort cost coefficient;(4) Along with the rise of consumers ’ offline consumption preference,the online product pricing and effort echelon of manufacturers are decreasing unanimously, and the retailers ’offline product pricing is affected by the logical relationship between the parameters of the demand function under different power structures.
作者
刘新民
孙向彦
吴士健
LIU Xinmin;SUN Xiang-yan;WU Shi-jian(College of Economics and Management,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266590,China;College of Management,Qingdao Agricultural University,Qingdao 266109,China)
出处
《系统工程》
北大核心
2021年第3期69-79,共11页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371111)
中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2014M551937)
山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2019MG030)
青岛市社科规划项目(QDSKL1801132)。
关键词
双渠道供应链
消费者异质偏好
不同权力结构
努力成本系数
Supply Chain with Dual-channel
Consumers’Heterogeneous Preferences
Different Power Structures
Coefficient of Effort Cost