摘要
基于行业极端收益率事件度量公司受机构投资者关注程度的外生变动,通过研究这一变动与公司盈余管理水平和形式的关联,克服机构持股比例与公司盈余管理活动的内生性问题,检验机构投资者对公司盈余管理的影响。以2008—2017年A股上市公司为研究对象,发现机构投资者因外生事件分心而降低对公司的关注时,公司会增加应计项目盈余管理,减少成本更高但更为隐蔽的真实活动盈余管理。进一步研究表明,监督作用更强的机构投资者分心时造成的影响更大,内外部治理机制较弱的公司受到机构分心效应的影响更大,机构分心时减少对公司的调研频率是导致公司盈余管理策略变动的可能影响路径。
Based on the industry extreme rate of return events,this paper measures the exogenous change of the company's attention by institutional investors.By studying the relationship between the change and the level and form of corporate earnings management,and overcoming the endogenous problem between institutional shareholding ratio and corporate earnings management activities,this paper tests the impact of institutional investors on corporate earnings management.Taking A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2017 as the research object,it is found that when institutional investors reduce their attention to the company due to the distraction of exogenous events,the company will increase accrual earnings management and reduce the higher cost but more hidden real activity earnings management.Further research shows that the impact of institutional investors with stronger supervision is greater when they are distracted,and companies with weaker internal and external governance mechanism are more affected by the effect of institutional distraction.Reducing the research frequency of companies when they are distracted is the possible impact path of earnings management strategy changes.
作者
张宗益
李雪
向诚
ZHANG Zong-yi;LI Xue;XIANG Cheng
出处
《改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第6期136-154,共19页
Reform
基金
重庆市自然科学基金项目“注意力约束对机构投资者监督治理职能的影响研究:信息披露的视角”(cstc2019jcyj-bshX0087)
国家自然科学基金项目“基于市场关注的股票特质波动风险研究”(71973018)。
关键词
机构投资者
有限关注
盈余管理
分心效应
institutional investors
limited attention
earnings management
distraction effect