新零售下考虑需求迁移的双线服务质量控制及协调研究

Service Quality Control and Coordination under New Retail Considering Demand Shift

考虑品牌商拥有线上直销渠道,分别建立了线下体验店为品牌商自营或零售商加盟两种情形下的双线服务质量控制模型,通过逆向归纳法求得品牌商和零售商均衡解。对比分析两种情形下的均衡结果,发现需求迁移会导致双重边际化,且随需求迁移增加,双重边际效应愈发明显。基于此,构建了基于成本共担的服务质量协调模型对双线服务质量进行了进一步的探讨。结果表明,一定条件下,成本共担契约可以提高双线服务质量.使品牌商和零售商收益得到Pareto改善。最后,通过数值计算,进一步分析了成本共担契约的协调效果。

By considering that brand owners own online direct sales channels,this paper establishes a dual-line service quality control model under the two cases of brand owners;own offline experience stores or retailersf joining,and obtains the equilibrium solution between brand owners and retailers by reverse induction.Then by comparing the results of the two situa-tions,the research finds that demand shift will lead to double marginalization,and the double marginal effect becomes more and more obvious with the increase of the demand shift.Hence,the paper constructs a service quality coordination model based on cost-sharing contract to further discuss dual-line service quality.The results show that the contract can increase the dual-line service quality and achieve Pareto improvement under certain conditions.Finally,the coordination effect of costsharing contract is further analyzed through numerical calculation.