线性需求供应链中供应商参股制造商的定价与协调

Pricing and Coordination of Supplier Shareholding Manufacturersunder Linear DemandSupply Chain

企业之间通过相互参股组成股权联盟提升收益和竞争力来应对多变的环境成为企业股权改革的趋势。在实际管理实践中,供应链各节点企业通过参股战略以改善各自绩效从而提升供应链效率。本文考虑在线性市场需求环境下,构建了由供应商A与制造商B组成的二级供应链,供应商A对制造商B实施参股战略的供应链模型。引入Stackelberg博弈模型,分别讨论分散式与集中式情况下各节点企业的最优决策。研究表明,供应商A对制造商B参股不能消除供应链双重边际效应,基于此设计了收益共享和线性转移支付的协调契约。该契约通过调整批发价使供应商A与制造商B以任意比例分配系统利润,使供应链完美协调。

The formation of equity alliances between enterprises through mutual shareholding to improve performance andcompetitivenessand respond to an increasingly complex environment has become the trend of corporate equity reform.Actually,each node of the supply chain improvesits performance and efficiencythrough the shareholding strategy.We introduce the Stackelberg game model to discuss the optimal decision of each node enterprise under decentralized and centralized conditions.The Stackelberg game model is introduced to discuss the optimal order quantity and price decision of each enterprise underdecentralized and centralized situations.The research shows that supplier A’s participation in manufacturer B cannot eliminate the double marginal effect of the supply chain.Based on this,a coordination contract for revenue sharing and linear transfer payment is designed.The contract allows supplier A and manufacturer B to distribute system profits in any proportion by adjusting the wholesale price,so that the supply chain is perfectly coordinated.