摘要
亚里士多德在《尼各马可伦理学》中对伦理学的“幸福”原理做了两个论证——“实践”论证与“人的活动”论证。尝试概括他的“实践”论证。论证包含如下三个核心之点:构成一个人“灵魂‘实现’”基础的是他作为一个实践者出于选择地追求某种善的、包含着他/她的灵魂能力的一个“实现”的活动;实践者的这样的实践最终指向以他整个一生来看是那个最终的东西的一个“蕴含的善”,由这样的实践造成的灵魂的“实现”也最终指向那个善所包含的灵魂的最充分的“实现”,那个善或所包含的那个最充分的“实现”就是幸福;它对于一个“认真的人”,也对于一个认真的实践者,是善,并且也对于他显得善。亚里士多德在这个论证上加了一个重要限定:这个实践者必定是先获得“良好教养”的。
In his Nicomachean Ethics,Aristotle provides two arguments for the principle of happiness of ethics,one is the practice argument,the other the argument of human activities.The aim of the paper is to summarize his practice argument.Three key points of the argument are as follows.The very basis of the soul-energeia of a human being lies in his practice pursuing some good by choice which involves some energeia of the dynamies of his soul;such sort of practice of a practitioner ultimately goes to⁃ward an inclusive good that is final seen from the point of viewing his life,meanwhile the energeia of the soul caused by it ulti⁃mately goes toward the fullest energeia involved in that inclusive good,with the good or the fullest energeia involved being his hap⁃piness;so far as a“serious human being”,yet a“serious practitioner”as well,is concerned,and it is good and it appears to be good for him.Aristotle puts a qualification on the argument saying that such a practitioner must have been well brought up in his early age.
出处
《上海师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第4期14-26,共13页
Journal of Shanghai Normal University(Philosophy & Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家社科基金重大项目“希腊罗马伦理学综合研究”资助。
关键词
“幸福”原理
“实践”论证
灵魂
能(潜在)
良好教养
the principle of happiness
practice argument
soul
dynamies(potentialities)
good upbringing