合作创新行为演化博弈与仿真研究——以种业科企合作为例

An Evolutionary Game and Simulation Study on Behavior of Collaborative Innovation:A Case of Collaboration Between Scientific Research Institutions and Enterprises

基于不完全契约理论,以种业企业与科研单位合作创新为例构建演化博弈模型,运用Matlab软件仿真分析交易成本和风险支出等额外成本、剩余控制权收益、机会主义收益以及奖惩金额等参数对科企双方行为的影响。研究表明,机会主义收益和额外成本越大,合作双方积极性降低,越易产生机会主义行为;而提高奖惩金额以及剩余控制权收益能够使合作双方趋向积极合作。在此基础上,提出减少机会主义行为、提高合作创新积极性的政策建议,以期推动种业科企合作的健康发展。

Based on the incomplete contract theory,the evolutionary game model of the breeding cooperation between the enterprises and the scientific research institutions is constructed and the Matlab software is applied in this paper.It is simulated and analyzed in this paper that what influence the additional costs of transaction costs and risk expenditures,benefits of residual control rights,opportunistic benefits,and parameters of reward and punishment make on breeding innovation of cooperation participants.It is shown in the study that the greater the opportunistic benefits and additional costs are,the lower the enthusiasm of the partners is and the more likely it is to conduct opportunistic behavior,while it is useful to increase the amounts of rewards and punishment and the benefits of residual control rights for more active cooperation between the two parties.On this basis,policy suggestions are proposed to improve the enthusiasm for cooperation and reduce opportunistic behaviors,with a view to promoting the healthy development of cooperation between scientific research institutions and enterprises in the seed industry.